Selecting Voting Locations for Fun and Profit by Fitzsimmons, Zack & Lev, Omer
Selecting Voting Locations for Fun and Profit
Zack Fitzsimmons∗
College of the Holy Cross
Worcester, MA USA
Omer Lev
Ben-Gurion University
Beersheeba, Israel
March 15, 2020
Abstract
While manipulative attacks on elections have been well-studied, only recently has attention
turned to attacks that account for geographic information, which are extremely common in the
real world. The most well known in the media is gerrymandering, in which district border-
lines are changed to increase a party’s chance to win, but a different geographical manipulation
involves influencing the election by selecting the location of polling places, as many people are
not willing to go to any distance to vote. In this paper we initiate the study of this manipulation.
We find that while it is easy to manipulate the selection of polling places on the line, it becomes
difficult already on the plane or in the case of more than two candidates. Moreover, we show that
for more than two candidates the problem is inapproximable. However, we find a few restricted
cases on the plane where some algorithms perform well. Finally, we discuss how existing results
for standard control actions hold in the geographic setting, consider additional control actions
in the geographic setting, and suggest directions for future study.
1 Introduction
When faced with a set of different options, the use of voting as a method to aggregate multiple agents’
preferences on those options is thousands of years old; possibly as old as human society. As human
societies grew, and the set of participants in the voting process grew with them, people quickly
encountered a problem: How to deal with such a large set of people? Even Athenian democracy,
which initially relied on a single decision making forum (the ecclesia), was fairly quickly subdivided
into subunits (demes), based on geographic location. While many things have changed since then,
the division of political units by location is still very common. This is generally done in two ways:
1. Each subdivision makes its choice, and sends representatives to an aggregated assembly. This
is the way elections are held in the US and in many Westminster type systems, in which subdi-
visions (e.g., UK constituencies, Canadian ridings, US districts) select a single representative,
and send it to the national parliament.
2. Subdivisions are used for organizational purposes only—voting (or polling) places divide people
according to where they live, but their vote is aggregated with other polling places in the same
voting unit. In some countries (e.g., Israel), polling places are the only geographic division,
while in others (e.g., US), polling places are the smallest geographic division, but others exist
composed of units of polling places (counties, districts, states).
∗Research done in part while on research visits to Ben-Gurion University and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
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The first case has been explored in the past few years in a series of papers (e.g., Bachrach et al.
(2016); Borodin et al. (2018)), mainly discussing the potential for manipulation by drawing the sub-
divisions’ borders (gerrymandering). The second case of the subdivisions—used for organizational
purposes only—has not, to the best of our knowledge, been significantly explored computationally.
The geographic problem in this case is not created by the voting rule, but by the location of
the voters and the limited amount of effort each voter is willing or able to expend to cast their
vote. Hence, the location of a polling place may have an effect on who votes there. Putting voting
locations in convenient places encourages people to vote in the election, while locating them far
away discourages participation. This form of control manipulation is already being implemented in
various locations (Nichols, 2018), and was recently a flashpoint in Georgia (Reid, 2018).
At its core, the problem is fairly straightforward: Voters are distributed in a geographic space,
each having a maximal distance they are willing to travel in order to vote. Assuming k polling
places are to be located in a particular area, can putting them in particular places ensure a specified
candidate’s victory? While we shall use the geographic interpretation throughout this paper, we
note that geographic distance is used as a proxy for difficulty of accessing a polling place, and
other interpretations are possible. For example, in order to encourage students to submit faculty
evaluations, the “distance” becomes how much effort each student needs to put in depending on
which platforms are used (e.g., paper forms, web, social networks, etc.).
Our results establish two parameters as key to the computational complexity of this problem.
The first is the dimension of the space, with the single dimension case easier than the plane and
beyond. Note that solving the single dimensional problem is not useless as might be thought at first
glance—not only can conceptual, nongeographic, settings be described by it, but even in political
settings, voting locations might be located near a central highway or transportation route.
The second parameter is the number of parties/candidates, with the complexity changing once we
leave the two-party system. Naturally, the two-party system is very common in many democracies,
but even in settings where there are multiple parties, in many subunits (electoral districts, ridings,
or constituencies) there are only two major competitive candidates, making the battle for electoral
control mainly one in which two sides participate.
In this paper we introduce a new model considering voter and polling place location,
and formalize the associated control problem. We show the complexity difference in the
two-party case between the line and higher dimension, and between the two-party and multi-party
case. Moreover, we show the multi-party problem is inapproximable. Finally, we discuss how
existing results translate to this model and novel results on new control problems which
are couched in real-world techniques.
2 Related Work
In this paper—as in geographic problems in general—we are particularly interested in control prob-
lems. That is, problems in which the design of the decision-making system is at play, and we wish
to explore how changing the design can influence the decision outcome. The computational study
of electoral control problems was introduced by Bartholdi et al. (1992) and includes natural scenar-
ios such as control by adding candidates (modeling the addition of spoiler candidates to ensure a
preferred outcome) and control by adding voters (modeling get-out-the-vote drives). Later work by
Hemaspaandra et al. (2007) considered the so-called destructive case where the goal of the agent
with control over the structure of the election is to ensure that a despised candidate does not win,
in contrast to the model of constructive control studied by Bartholdi et al. (1992) where the goal of
the agent is to ensure that their preferred candidate wins. See the book chapter by Faliszewski and
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Rothe (2016) for a recent survey of results on electoral control.
We use a distance-bound to model each voter’s ability to vote at a polling place. This is similar
to the use of prices as used in priced electoral control (Miasko and Faliszewski, 2016), and in the
related problem of bribery (Faliszewski et al., 2009), where an agent sets the votes of a subcollection
of the voters to ensure a preferred outcome after meeting the price to change their vote.
Selecting a polling place in our model can be seen as adding the group of currently nonpartici-
pating voters within their distance-bound to that polling place to the election. This idea of control
by adding groups of voters was previously explored in different ways by Erde´lyi et al. (2015) and
Bulteau et al. (2015). Note that though we are adding “groups” of voters, this is quite different from
the case of voters with weights. A voter with weight ω can be thought of as a group of ω voters with
the same vote, but in our case a group of voters voting at a polling place may have different votes
and the “weights” at a polling place may be different depending on if voters may be able to vote
at a different polling place. The complexity of weighted control was studied by Faliszewski et al.
(2015).
Erde´lyi et al. (2015) consider a form of control by adding voters where groups of voters must be
added together. However, in none of these models can the handling of overlap between groups be
adapted to the geography-based groups we consider.
Bulteau et al. (2015) introduced a model of control by adding voters in which voters are grouped
together (that is, one cannot add a voter without adding some other voters) and explored different
bundling functions to define the groups. While this has some similarity with adding a polling place
and getting along with it all voters which are within their distance-bound to its location, the entire
conceptual framework does not apply to our case.1
There is also some relation to facility location problems, where the facility locations (which are
the candidates) are from a fixed set (rather than everywhere), as explored in Feldman et al. (2016).
Note that many settings explored in this research direction tend to be on the one-dimensional line.
More closely related to our line of work are geographic manipulations of voting districts, com-
monly referred to as gerrymandering. This has been a topic of growing interest in the computational
social choice community. The theoretical bounds on the influence of gerrymandering on the out-
come of an election were established in Bachrach et al. (2016), and complexity results were shown
in Lewenberg et al. (2017), and expanded upon in Cohen-Zemach et al. (2018), focusing on graphs.
We note that while Lewenberg et al. (2017) did not formally prove a greedy algorithm is an ap-
proximation algorithm for the gerrymandering problem, they did use it, de facto, as an algorithm
to solve practical cases of gerrymandering (Pegden et al. (2017) suggested a different way to tackle
gerrymandering, based on cake-cutting ideas). Borodin et al. (2018) investigated how geographic
spread affects gerrymandering ability, though those results are mostly empirical. Furthermore, there
is a whole line of research on allowing agents to move between districts, a form of “reverse gerry-
mandering,” that has also been investigated in the past few years (see, Bervoets and Merlin (2012);
van Bevern et al. (2015); Lev and Lewenberg (2019)).
3 Preliminaries
An election consists of a set of candidates C and a collection of voters V where each voter has a
corresponding vote or preference order that strictly ranks the candidates in C from most to least
preferred. An election system E is a mapping from an election to a set of winning candidates. The
1The interesting properties they investigate in their models, such as leader-anonymous or follower-anonymous,
have no relevance in our setting.
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best-known election system is plurality, in which each candidate gets a point from each voter that
ranks them first in their preference order, and the candidates with the highest score win.
In our setting, in addition to their preferences over the candidates, all voters are located in a
metric space (M, dM).2 Each voter v ∈ V has an associated location xv ∈ M and a nonnegative
distance-bound dv ∈ R. We also have a set of potential polling places L ⊆ M, each place ` ∈ L
is defined using its location. A voter is able to vote only if there is a polling place ` for which
dM(xv, `) ≤ dv. Formally, the winner problem for an election system E in this setting:
Name: E-Geographic-Winner
Given: A set of candidates C, a set of voters V where each v ∈ V has a location in a metric space
xv ∈ M (e.g., R2), a preference order v, and a distance-bound to vote dv, a set of polling
places L ⊆M and a candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is p a winner using election system E when all voters V within dv to a polling place in
L vote?
To compute the geographic winner for an election system E , we must first determine which voters
are within their distance-bound to a polling place. This can clearly be done in polynomial time.
Thus each election system with a polynomial-time winner problem has a polynomial-time geographic
winner problem. More generally we can state the following observation.
Observation 1. For every election system E the corresponding E-Geographic-Winner problem is in
PE−winner.
3.1 Electoral Control
A natural model of electoral control in the geographic setting is to consider how an election chair with
control of the election can select polling places to ensure their preferred outcome. It is realistic to
assume that the election chair is required to place at least a specified number of polling places, since
otherwise the election would be easily viewed as unfair, and so this is also included in our model.
We present the formal definition of the constructive case below (where the goal of the election
chair is to ensure a preferred candidate wins) Bartholdi et al. (1992), but we will also consider the
destructive case (where the goal of the election chair is to ensure that a despised candidate does not
win) Hemaspaandra et al. (2007).
Name: E-Constructive Polling Place Control
Given: A set of candidates C, a set of voters V where each v ∈ V has a location in a metric space
xv ∈ M, a preference order v, and a distance to vote dv, a set of possible polling places in
the plane L ⊆M, a preferred candidate p ∈ C, and a parameter k.
Question: Does there exist a set of polling places L′ ⊆ L such that |L′| ≥ k and p is a winner of
the geographic election (C, V, L′) using the election system E?
2We stress that this is not putting the voters and candidates in an “ideological” metric space, a` la Schofield (2008)—
the candidates are not on the metric space, and voters are not single peaked in the sense of preferring candidates
closer to them. This is literal physical space, which has nothing to do with the preferences.
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4 The Two-Party System
In this section we will focus on settings of a two-party system, which is quite common across
democratic countries. That is, we assume |C| = 2.
We first consider a simpler version of our problem, where the voters and polling places are on
the real line instead of on the plane, i.e.,M = R. For our voting scenario, this can model situations
such as the selection of polling places along a bus line in a city, where the bus line’s route can be
viewed as a straight line.
Theorem 2. Constructive and Destructive Polling Place Control for plurality elections over two
candidates with voters located on the real line (M = R) is in P.
Proof. We consider the constructive case below. The constructive algorithm can be easily adapted
for the destructive case.
Let C = {p, r}, V , L, p, and k be an instance of Polling Place Control where the voters and
the polling places are located on R. We will show that we can determine if p can be made a
plurality winner in the geographic setting by selecting voting locations using dynamic programming
in polynomial time.
Our dynamic programming algorithm works as follows. We first order the polling places with
respect to R. We construct the dynamic programming table so that T [a, b, last] is the maximum
margin for p (i.e., score(p)− score(r)) using b of the first a polling places (ordered from left to right
along R), where “last” is the last polling place picked. A solution to our problem is found if there
is a nonnegative margin in the table for k polling places. When filling out the table we can easily
determine which voters within their distance to a polling place under consideration are overlapping
with a polling place already picked with just the information for the last polling place picked. q
We now continue, and try to see if this result holds for more complex metric mechanisms. As
with related election problems with geographic constraints (Lewenberg et al., 2017), in general the
problem in the plane is NP-complete, as we present below. We then discuss natural restrictions to
this problem.
Theorem 3. Constructive and Destructive Polling Place Control for plurality elections with voters
located in the plane (M = R2) is NP-complete for two candidates even when all voters have the
same distance-bound.
Proof. Membership of our problem in NP is easy to see.
Our voting problem locates the voters in the plane, so the most straightforward reduction will
be to start with an appropriate planar NP-complete problem.
Planar Vertex Cover is NP-complete Garey et al. (1976), even for cubic planar graphs (i.e., graphs
where each vertex has degree at most three) (Garey and Johnson, 1977).
Name: Cubic Planar Vertex Cover
Given: A Cubic (i.e., maximal degree is 3 or fewer) planar graph G = (V,E) and an integer k.
Question: Does there exist a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V such that |V ′| ≤ k and for each (u, v) ∈ E,
u ∈ V ′ or v ∈ V ′?
It will be useful to work with this problem embedded into the grid. We will show that the
following rectilinear version of Cubic Planar Vertex Cover is NP-complete.3
3We mention that the some of our construction follows the general contours of a construction from Chan and Hu
(2015), which shows a related geometric set covering problem to be NP-hard.
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Figure 1: The process to produce Ĝ in the proof of Lemma 4. (a) shows our initial graph; (b) shows a graph
embedded onto the grid; (c) shows the addition of nodes at grid points, and a special orange node to make
each edge have even number of additional vertices; (d) shows the added pairs of vertices dividing the larger
edges.
Name: Restricted Rectilinear Cubic Planar Vertex Cover
Given: A cubic planar graph G = (V,E) embedded in a grid such that all edges are on integer
gridlines and of length 1 or 1.5, and an integer k.
Question: Does there exist a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V such that |V ′| ≤ k and for each (u, v) ∈ E,
u ∈ V ′ or v ∈ V ′?
Lemma 4. Restricted Rectilinear Cubic Planar Vertex Cover is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP is easy to see. Let G = (V,E) and k be an instance of Cubic Planar
Vertex Cover.
Valiant (1981) shows that a planar graph (V,E) where each vertex has maximum degree four can
be drawn in polynomial time in a O(|V |)×O(|V |) grid such that each vertex has integer coordinates
and the edges are comprised of line segments along the integer gridlines, and the edges do not
intersect with each other. We apply this construction to our graph and then subdivide the edges
by adding vertices at each intersection of integer gridlines so that each edge in this new graph has
length one. If an edge is not subdivided by an even number of vertices, we add an additional vertex
at the midpoint between one of the original vertices of the edge and the closest vertex we added, so
that overall, every original edge has been divided by adding an even number of vertices to the edge.
Now all of the edges are length 1 or 1/2.
For each of the edges of length 1, we add two additional vertices to subdivide the edge into three
equal segments, i.e., one at 1/3 and the other at 2/3. Note that this maintains that each original
edge has been divided by an even number of new vertices. We then rescale all of our edges by 3 so
that they are all of length 1.5 or of length 1. Denote this new graph Ĝ = (V̂ , Ê) (see Figure 1).
When we subdivide an edge by adding two vertices to a given graph, the size of a minimum
vertex cover increases by one. Each edge in a graph has at least one of its vertices in a minimum
vertex cover. When an edge is subdivided by adding two vertices, it is “replaced” with three edges.
One of the outer edges must be covered by a vertex in the original minimum vertex cover. To cover
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Figure 2: The added voters and ballot boxes on an edge (vi, vj). The circles denote the voters’ distance-
bounds. In order not to complicate the drawing further, the distance-bounds for the r voters on the edges
are not shown, but they are 0.375, thus extending past the p voter on one side and a vertex on the other,
but not as far as reaching another polling place.
the edge between the two added vertices and the other outer edge, one of the added vertices must
be included in a minimum vertex cover of the updated graph.
It is straightforward to see that G has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if Ĝ has a
vertex cover of size kˆ = k + 0.5t, with t being the number of added vertices. q
Having shown Lemma 4, we will now put it to use. Let G = (V,E) and k be an instance of
Restricted Rectilinear Cubic Planar Vertex Cover. We now construct an instance of Constructive
Polling Place Control for plurality elections (see Figure 2 for an example of a constructed edge).
• Let the set of candidates be {p, r}.
• For each vertex vi ∈ V create one voter for r at that location with distance-bound 0.375.
• For each edge {vi, vj} ∈ V create one voter voting for p located at the midpoint of the edge
with distance-bound 0.375.
• For each edge {vi, vj} ∈ V add two polling places to L: one at the midpoint between the voter
for r at vi and the voter for p at the midpoint, and the other at the midpoint between the
voter for r at vj and the voter for p
• At the location of every polling place, add an additional voter for r. This brings to a total of
three voters located on each edge (without the vertices)—two supporting r and one supporting
p.
• Add one additional polling place qˆ at a distance strictly greater than 1.5 from the constructed
graph with an additional k voters for p located at that same location with distance-bound
0.375.
• Let the number of polling places to have be |E|+ 1.
We will now show that G has a vertex cover of size k if and only if there exists a subset of |E|+1
polling places to select such that p is a plurality winner in the geographic setting.
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Suppose that G has a vertex cover of size k. Let this vertex cover be V ′. For each vertex v ∈ V ′,
select each polling place within a distance of 0.375 to v if there is not already a polling place selected
on that edge. Since V ′ is a vertex cover, we will have selected |E| polling places. It is easy to see
that selecting these polling places will result in |E| voters for p and |E|+ k voters for r to be within
their distance to a polling place. p is made a winner by also selecting the polling place qˆ.
For the converse, suppose that G does not have a vertex cover of size k. Then we will show that
there is no subset of at least |E| + 1 polling places to add such that p is a plurality winner in the
geographic setting. There are at most |E| votes for p among the polling places in L′ \ qˆ, and if we
select two polling places on the same edge, the second only adds more votes for r (specifically either
one or two additional votes for r), and no votes for p. Assume that we have a subset L′ of at least
|E|+ 1 polling places such that p is a plurality winner in the geographic setting. Then we know that
qˆ must be in L′, and the remaining polling places selected can have at most k more votes for r than
for p. Consider the remaining polling places in L′ \ qˆ. We know that at least |E| polling places were
selected, and they contribute at most k votes for r over p. However, the only polling places which do
not add more r votes than p votes are those for which the r voter located on a vertex already votes
elsewhere. That is, the vertex voter overlaps for several polling places. If p is a winner, this overlap
must happen for at least |E| − k polling places. That is, |E| − k polling places did not change the
balance between p and r and did not include the vertex r voter. The k that did include that voter
are thus a vertex cover of G of size k. This is a contradiction.
Notice that essentially the same reduction can be used for the destructive case. There the goal
would be to ensure that r does not win. And there would be k + 1 votes for p at qˆ. So then in the
case where there is a vertex cover, p beats r, and in the case where there is not a vertex cover, r is
a winner. q
4.1 Natural Restrictions to the Planar Case
When we consider some natural restrictions to the overlap between choice of polling places we have
several tractable cases. The simplest case is when no voter is able to vote at more than one of the
polling places under consideration. In this case it is easy to see that the greedy approach of choosing
the polling places in order of margin for p is optimal when there are two candidates.
Theorem 5. Constructive and Destructive Polling Place Control for plurality elections over two
candidates with voters located in any metric space M is in P when no voter v ∈ V is within dv of
more than one polling place in L.
Notice that this result can be extended to instances where there is a fixed number of polling
places that share voters in common.
Theorem 6. Constructive and Destructive Polling Place Control for plurality elections over two
candidates with voters located in a metric space M is in P when the number of overlapping polling
places is fixed.
Proof. If there are T overlapping polling places, this means there are at most 2T different com-
binations of overlapping polling places that can be considered. For every 0 ≤ i ≤ T , one finds the
best k − i polling places from those that don’t overlap any others (in P from Theorem 5). Then it
looks for the set of i polling places from those that overlap, and see what set optimizes the outcome.
Once all T + 1 possibilities has been examined, chose the best one. q
It is natural to wonder if this result can be pushed any further. For example, for a fixed parameter
`, each voter is within their distance to at most ` polling places. However, the construction from
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Figure 3: The placement of voters in Example 7. The dotted lines indicate where each set of voters can
vote.
the proof of Theorem 3 shows hardness for the case of ` = 3. This leaves open the question of what
happens for the case of ` = 2. In Example 7 below we show that the obvious greedy approach will
not solve this case.
Example 7. Examine this instance of polling place control. Let C = {p, r} be the set of candidates,
let the set of polling places be L = {A,B,C} with A located at (1, 1), B located at (2, 2), and C
located at (2.5, 1). Let there be the following voters all with distance 1.
20 voters for p at (1.5, 0.5) that can vote at A or C.
30 voters for p at (1.5, 1.5) that can vote at A or B.
35 voters for r at (2.5, 1.5) that can vote at B or C.
51 voters for r at (1, 1) that can vote at A.
5 voters for r at (2, 2) that can vote at B.
Let k = 2 and the preferred candidate be p (see Figure 3).
The margin for p at A is −1, at B is −10, and at C is −15. So the greedy approach will choose
A. After choosing A, the margin for p at B is −40 and at C is −35. And this algorithm would
return that there is no way to allocate at least 2 polling places such that p wins. However, if we
instead choose the polling places B and C, p wins.
This greedy approach fails to find a solution when one exists due to the overlap of voters between
polling places, and so it cannot even be used as an approximation.
5 Multi-Party System
Unlike in the case of different distance-bounds for voters, when we move to the case of more than
two candidates, polling place control for plurality elections becomes NP-complete even when voters
can vote at most at one location.
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When voters can vote at most at one location, the mapping to the metric space is trivial and
we are instead left with considering how to add groups of voters to an initially empty set of voters
to ensure that a preferred candidate wins. We show the following hardness result for the case of an
unbounded number of candidates where the voting locations do not serve any of the same voters as
another (that is, making the problem easier, as can be seen in the two-party case above).
Theorem 8. Constructive Polling Place Control for plurality elections is NP-complete for multiple
candidates even when voters can vote at most at one location and M = R.
Proof. Membership in NP is easy to see. We show NP-hardness by a reduction from from Exact
Cover by 3-Sets (Karp, 1972), defined below.
Name: Exact Cover by 3-Sets
Given: A set B = {b1, . . . , b3k}, and a collection S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of three-element subsets of B.
Question: Does there exist a subcollection S ′ of S such that every element of B occurs in exactly
one member of S ′?
Given an instance of Exact Cover by 3-Sets, B = {b1, . . . , b3k} and S = {S1, . . . , Sn} such that
each Si = {bi1, bi2, bi3}, we construct the following instance of polling place control.
Let the set of candidates be C = B∪{p}. In this construction, all voters will have distance-bound
1/2. For each Si ∈ S, create a polling place at location (i) with k − 2 votes for each b ∈ B, with an
additional k votes for bi1, bi2, and bi3 (so each of these candidates has 2k − 2 voters at this polling
place), and k− 1 votes for p. Let the preferred candidate be p, and let the number of polling places
to be selected be k.
Suppose there exists an exact cover S ′. For each Si ∈ S ′, add the polling place at location (i).
Then each candidate bi has score exactly (k − 2)k + k = k2 − k and p has score (k − 1)k = k2 − k,
and p wins.
If there is a way to make p win by choosing at least k polling places then there must exist an
exact cover. p gets k2 − k points from any subset of k polling places, and so the polling places
selected must give each bi candidate at most k
2− k votes. Thus exactly k of the polling places were
selected and these k polling places must correspond to an exact cover, otherwise some candidate bi
has score greater than k2 − k. q
Inapproximability Consider the optimization version of polling place control where we seek to
maximize the number of polling places selected. This problem exhibits nonmonotonicity as an
optimization problem, i.e., for a given set of polling places L that ensures a given candidate p wins
it is not always the case that p wins when a subset of L was selected. More generally, for a given
optimal solution to this maximization problem, it is not the case that a worse solution is always
valid. And we show the following inapproximability result.
Theorem 9. It is NP-hard to approximate the number of polling places to select so that p is a
plurality winner in the geographic setting by any factor for the case of multiple candidates even when
voters can vote at most at one location and M = R.
The above proof follows from adapting the NP-hardness reduction from the proof of Theorem 8
to show that it is NP-hard to determine if a given candidate p is a plurality winner in the geographic
setting by adding a nonempty set of polling places, i.e, is it optimal to select 0 or more than 0
polling places to ensure p wins. This implies that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimization
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version of polling place control for plurality elections in this multicandidate setting. We mention
that a similar approach to showing inapproximability was used by Caragiannis et al. (2012) to prove
the inapproximability of Young score, another voting problem that exhibits nonmonotonicity as an
optimization problem.
5.1 Standard Control Actions in the Geographic Setting
Our focus has been to explore how an election chair with control over the selection of voting locations
can ensure their preferred outcome in a geographic election. However, as previously mentioned, this
geographic model for elections is quite natural and standard models of control (and many other
election problems) can be considered in this setting.
It is easy to see that NP-hardness results from the standard setting for control by
adding/deleting/partitioning candidates/voters in both the constructive and the destructive cases are
inherited to the corresponding actions of control by adding/deleting/partitioning candidates/voters
for geographic elections. First, we show that the existing problems’ results extend to our new
domain. For clarity we formally define the problem of constructive control by deleting voters intro-
duced by Bartholdi et al. (1992). Recall that the corresponding destructive cases were introduced
by Hemaspaandra et al. (2007).4
Name: E-Constructive Control by Deleting Voters
Given: An election (C, V ), a delete limit k, and a preferred candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a subcollection of voters V ′ ⊂ V such that |V ′| ≤ k and p is a winner
of the election (C, V \ V ′) using election system E?
The variant of the above control problem in the geographic setting replaces the standard form
of an election (C, V ) with our geographic variant (C, V, L). Notice that the polling places in the
election are given, we are not selecting a set of polling places for these variants.
Observation 10. Each standard constructive and destructive control action polynomial-time many
one reduces to the corresponding control action in the geographic setting.
Proof. We consider the case of Constructive Control by Deleting Voters. The other cases follow
from essentially the same approach.
Given an instance of E-Constructive Control by Deleting Voters, (C, V ), k, and p, we construct
an instance of E-Constructive Control by Deleting Voters in the geographic setting.
Let the candidate set C, delete limit k, and preferred candidate p remain the same. For each
voter vi ∈ V , construct a voter at (0, i) with distance-bound 0.5 and add a polling place at (0, i) to
L.
It is straightforward to see that if there exists a way to delete up to k voters such that p is a
winner, deleting these same voters in the constructed geographic instance makes p a winner in that
setting and vice versa. q
As a result of Observation 10, for a given election system, if a standard control action is NP-hard,
it remains NP-hard in the geographic setting. At first glance it may seem that the structure of the
geographic setting may be able to realize an increase in the complexity of polynomial-time control
actions. However, this is not the case.
4Both Bartholdi et al. (1992) and Hemaspaandra et al. (2007) use the so-called unique-winner model where the
goal of the chair is to ensure that their preferred candidate is (is not) the unique winner, while we consider the now
more commonly studied nonunique winner model. However, this section’s results hold for both models.
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Observation 11. Each standard constructive and destructive control action in the geographic setting
polynomial-time many one reduces to the corresponding standard control action.
Proof. We consider the case of Constructive Control by Deleting Voters in the geographic setting.
The other cases follow from essentially the same approach.
Given an instance of E-Constructive Control by Deleting Voters in the geographic setting,
(C, V, L), k, and p, we construct an instance of E-Constructive Control by Deleting Voters.
Let the candidate set C, delete limit k, and preferred candidate p remain the same. For each v ∈ V
include v in the constructed election if there exists a polling place ` ∈ L such that dM(xv, `) ≤ dv
(i.e., the voter v can vote at the polling place `). It is easy to see that this reduction holds. q
5.2 Additional Control Actions
We can also define additional new natural models for control in the geographic setting. For example,
consider the scenario where an agent can change the distance-bound for a subcollection of the voters
to ensure their preferred outcome. We wish to stress that while in regular voting setting one might
scoff at directly bribing voters as a rare occurrence (except as campaigning), in our setting, changing
the distance bound for voters is easily done with perfectly legal means—organize a ride, or a bus, or
any other form of transport to help voters reach their polling places. For preventing voter to vote,
a candidate can cause traffic delays with rallies (or politically-devised traffic jams (Zernike, 2015)):
Name: E-Constructive Control by Distance-Bound Change
Given: A set of candidates C, a set of voters V where each v ∈ V has a location in a metric space
xv ∈M (e.g., the plane, R2), a preference order v, and a distance-bound to vote dv, a set of
polling places L ⊆M and a candidate p ∈ C, and a budget k
Question: Do there exist subcollections of voters V ′ ⊆ V and W ′ ⊆ V with V ′ ∩W ′ = ∅ such that ∑
vi∈V ′
(dvi −min(dvi , dM(xvi , Lvi )) + )
+
 ∑
vi∈W ′
(max(dvi , dM(xvi , Lvi ))− dvi )
 ≤ k
for some  > 0.5 Lvi is the location of the polling place nearest vi and p is a winner using
election system E of the geographic election (C, V̂ , L) where V̂ consists of the voters from V
with updated distance-bounds for voters in V ′ and W ′?
In the problem above, the difference between a voter’s distance-bound and the distance to the
closest polling place can be viewed as their “price” for participating in the election. We can show
this problem to be in P for plurality elections by a reduction to multimode priced control by adding
voters and deleting voters introduced by Miasko and Faliszewski (2016).
Name: E-Priced Constructive Control by Adding Voters and Deleting Voters
Given: An election (C, V ), a set of unregistered voters W , cost function cost for each voter in
V ∪W , a candidate p ∈ C, and a budget k.
5Practically, it is as small as one wishes. It is simply needed to make the distance of voter vi just a bit smaller
than will make it able to reach its ballot box.
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Question: Do there exist subcollections V ′ ⊆ V and W ′ ⊆ W such that cost(V ′ ∪W ′) ≤ k and p
is a winner of the election (C, (V \ V ′) ∪W ′) using election system E?
Theorem 12. Constructive Control by Distance-Bound Change for plurality elections is in P.
Proof. Let (C, V, L), k, and p be an instance of Control by Distance-Bound Change for plurality
elections. We construct the following instance of Priced Constructive Control by Adding Voters and
Deleting Voters for plurality elections.
Since the algorithm developed by Miasko and Faliszewski (2016) uses only integer or rational
numbers, we also need to convert our real numbers into those. We take  > 0 such that 2 is
smaller than the amount any voter’s distance-bound must change to change from voting to not
voting and vice versa, excluding voters within exactly their distance-bound to a polling place (i.e.,
2 < min{|dv − dM(xv, `)| | v ∈ V, ` ∈ L, dM(xv, `) 6= dv}).6
• Let the set of candidates C and preferred candidate p remain the same.
• We take as our budget kˆ a rational number that is in the range (k + , k + |V |+1|V | ).
• Let the set of registered voters V̂ consist of each voter v ∈ V such that there exists an
` ∈ L with dM(xv, `) ≤ dv (i.e., they are within their distance-bound to at least one polling
place). If there exists an ` ∈ L such that xv = `, set cost(v) = kˆ + 1.7 Otherwise, set
cost(v) = dv − (min{dM(xv, `) | ` ∈ L} − ).
• Let the set of unregistered voters Ŵ consist of each voter v ∈ V such that no ` ∈ L with
dM(xv, `) ≤ dv exists (i.e., they are not within their distance-bound to any polling place). Let
cost(v) = min{dM(xv, `) | ` ∈ L} − dv.
For each cost(v), we look for a rational number that is in the range (cost(v), cost(v) + |V | ), so
all parameter for the Miasko and Faliszewski (2016) algorithm are rational. Note that the maximal
amount we added to the costs with |V | is , and thus if the cost could be met by k it could be met
by kˆ. If the cost could not be met by k, neither could it be by kˆ, since even giving all the added
amount to a single agent would not change their ability to vote (since even 2 would not be enough).
Changing the distance-bound of a voter so that they can no longer vote corresponds to meeting
the price to delete a registered voter, and changing the distance-bound of a voter so that they can
vote, when they previously were not within their distance-bound to a polling place corresponds to
adding a voter from the set of unregistered voters.
The reduction itself is straightforward: If the distance-bound of the voters in the geographic
setting can be changed using a total budget of k (allowing them to vote/refrain from voting as needed)
to ensure that p is a winner, then in the constructed instance of priced control, this corresponds to
paying the same voters to be added/deleted with a budget of kˆ to ensure that p is a winner, and
vice versa. q
More natural control actions to consider in future work are integrating control by selecting
polling places into the framework of multimode electoral control introduced by Faliszewski et al.
6The algorithm from Miasko and Faliszewski (2016) is for the unique-winner winner model, but is easily adapted
for the nonunique winner model.
7These voters are located exactly at a polling place and will vote even if their distance-bound is set to 0. Therefore
we set the price of deleting these voters to be larger than the budget in the constructed priced control instance so
that they cannot be deleted.
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(2011). Briefly, multimode control considers the scenario where the election chair uses multiple
control actions to achieve their goal. One example is the control by adding voters and deleting
voters mentioned above for the priced setting. It is natural to consider that an election chair that is
able to select polling places would also be able to control the structure of the election in other ways.
6 Discussion and Future Work
We introduced a new model for studying election problems that takes into account geographic
information. We examined the complexity of electoral control by selecting voting locations in this
geographic setting. We compared how the complexity is affected by different parameters such as the
two-party setting and settings with an unbounded number of candidates, and the cases where voters
and polling places are placed on the line vs. being placed on the plane. Furthermore, we linked this
setting with some of the existing problems in voting complexity in the nongeographic setting.
There are many different avenues for future work, as noted at the end of the previous sections.
A specific open problem for future work is the complexity of polling place control when voters can
vote at most at two locations. Beyond that, further exploring how existing problems in election
manipulation and control change once the geographic element is added is and interesting idea, as
well as introducing of new models to capture natural scenarios in this setting. A more radical
direction is to re-interpret the distance-bounds dv as a statistical measure, indicating probability
of voting at a location of particular distance. This allows for richer settings, and more complex
problems and analysis, and combines more deeply with geographic (urban/rural) considerations.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank Edith Hemaspaandra and anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments.
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